I. The problems of political spectrums[1]

In political discourse, the idea of a ‘political spectrum’ offers a useful shorthand way to describe a person’s or group’s political views. These models usually run from left to right, often including political ideologies such as communism, socialism, liberalism, centrism, conservatism, and fascism.

[Figure 1: The standard one-dimensional political spectrum]

As a theoretical tool, the ’political spectrum’ operates at a high level of abstraction. When applied correctly, it should give an accurate general indication of one’s political views, even when the specific details are complex or highly personalised.

Yet, the use of the one-dimensional, left-right political spectrum is often criticised as simplistic, glossing over important theoretical and ideological distinctions. For this reason, there have been several attempts to elaborate upon the one-dimensional model to capture these variations.

[Figure 2: Political figures placed on the compass, posted on r/PoliticalCompass in July 2022]

The Political Compass, is a notable example. In addition to an economic left-right axis, it adds an up-down, ‘authoritarian/libertarian’ dimension, intended to capture differing views the role of government in society.

Yet, while popular, the Political Compass has has been widely criticised by academics and journalists on multiple fronts. This includes its framing, which seemingly endorses the libertarian view that the government is an external imposition on society. Criticism has also targeted the quiz that the Compass uses, which often generates unusual or unexpected results.

To these, I would add that the usefulness of the ’authoritarian/libertarian’ axis is also questionable. Setting aside the fact that the term ‘authoritarian’ generally carries negative connotations, governments described as such ordinarily fall on the margins of the one-dimensional left-right model anyway. The Compass’s up/down axis thus adds little to the standard left-right model.

[Figure 3: Horseshoe theory]

This observation, in fact, underlies another alternative to the standard left-right model, known as ‘horseshoe theory’, which claims that political views on the margins of the left/right spectrum, share ’authoritarian’ characteristics, causing them to converge. Horseshoe theory therefore tends to promote a kind of centrist, neoliberal politics.

However, this theory has also been criticised for conflating a shared opposition to centrism, on both the far-left and far-right, with shared values and political objectives. In so doing, it glosses over ideological distinctions to perhaps an even greater extent than the basic left-right model it seeks to replace. For these reasons and others, the relevance of horseshoe theory is generally dismissed by political scientists.[2]

II. The failure to categorise ’foreign policy’ views

While the criticisms levelled at these three kinds of political spectrum are valid, they are generally preoccupied with their shortcomings in assessing domestic policy positions. Accordingly, the possibility of building a spectrum model for foreign policy positions remains generally unexplored outside of jokes and internet memes.

Even so, the fact that the left-right political spectrum has assumed the status of a cultural meme means that its role in framing political discussions is almost inescapable. In light of recent geopolitical events, especially in Ukraine and Palestine, deployment of the standard left-right spectrum has led to a great deal of theoretical confusion. Accordingly, when discussing political attitudes towards these issues, mainstream Western media has made repeated claims that both the ‘far-left’ and ‘far-right’ are aligned on both issues, favouring Russia and Palestine (or Hamas), respectively.[3]

[Figure 4: A proposed Ukraine/Gaza horseshoe]

These half-hearted attempts at constructing a ‘foreign policy’ spectrum to understand Western discourse have been rather glib and misleading. For the most part, they repeat the fallacies of the horseshoe theory, with the overall aim of these efforts being the delegitimisation of opposition to Western imperial ventures in Ukraine and Palestine as being a ‘fringe’ characteristic of the far-left and far-right.

Motivated reasoning aside, the ‘foreign policy’ horseshoe falls apart when put to proof. Like its domestic counterpart, it conflates superficial similarities between far-left and far-right as evidence of shared principles and values.

Some inconvenient facts that falsify the horseshoe theory may include the fact that neo-Nazi units have been formally integrated into Ukraine’s armed forces and national guard, with Western fascist militants signing on as volunteers. This has given elements of the Western far-right an opportunity to gain practical battlefield experience alongside Ukrainian forces.[4]

[Figure 5: Foreign policy political compass meme, made by Chinese netizens. While intended as a joke, it is closer to the mark than the Ukraine/Gaza horseshoe]

The idea that pro-Palestine sentiment is characteristic of the Western far-right is even more problematic. As a Western imperial proxy in the Middle East, Israel enjoys near-uncritical support from the American right in general, and from neoconservatives in particular.

Moreover, while it is true that some on the far-right oppose Israel purely out of an antisemitic dislike of things they perceive as ’Jewish’, antisemitism does not entail anti-Zionism, nor vice-versa. Many Western Jews oppose Israel’s claim to being the ‘home of the Jewish people’ and a manifestation of their ‘right to self determination.’[5] As such, they are certainly more pro-Palestine than far-right Christian Zionists, many of whom harbour openly antisemitic views.[6]

Thus, given the failures of mainstream media attempts to place Western foreign policy views on a left-right spectrum, some form of correction is in order. The following is a somewhat non-scientific attempt to categorise accurately the kinds of foreign policy positions that exist in Western discourse. In this, it attempts to capture the underlying assumptions and views that Western observers actually have. If successful, it should also explain the apparent alignment that the political left and right occasionally have on foreign policy, even as they diverge on domestic economic and social policy.

III. Limiting factors, definitions, and caveats

A. Western ‘foreign policy’

First, it is important to define what is meant by ‘foreign policy’. Here, this term is defined as a distinctly Western mode of conceiving geopolitics, resulting from the global influence and preponderant geopolitical power of the Western bloc.

As opposed to diplomacy, which is pursued on a basis of sovereign equality, a relative balance of power, negotiation, and the making of mutual concessions to realise a common object, foreign policy is concerned chiefly with how the home state acts upon other states. The conceptual bedrock of ‘foreign policy’ is thus essentially interventionist, if not imperialist. Unilateral concessions are often demanded and expected of the target state, sometimes under threat or use of kinetic force or economic warfare (i.e., ‘hard power’).

For this reason, practitioners of foreign policy are usually sceptical of diplomacy. Practicing diplomacy can even undermine foreign policy. If target states are treated as sovereign entities with their own agency and an independent set of priorities, this sets a political precedent, which may give rise to an expectation that they be consulted with, rather than merely acted upon. In turn, this may limit the scope of possible actions that the home state can take with regard to target states, thereby constraining the scope of their foreign policy options.

Given that the purpose of foreign policy is to ‘put [a state’s] domestic policy into effect’,[7] the preferred practice of Western practitioners is to keep such debates internal, before a final proposal is put to the target state, often in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it demand for unilateral concessions. For this reason, any ‘foreign policy’ spectrum will only be relevant to the minority of states with sufficient geopolitical power to conduct foreign policy in this way.

B. Liberal democracy

A further limitation is that such a spectrum will only apply to ‘liberal-democratic’ states with an open market economy and a culture of electoral politics. States with political systems other than liberal-democracy are governed by a different set of dynamics and act under different constraints. This means that any political spectrum that applies to a liberal-democratic state will be irrelevant to a country with a different political-economic system.

For instance, a Marxist in a Western state will generally be against all forms of intervention on principle. Yet, if the same person held the same set of political convictions in a Marxist-Leninist state, they may be open to certain forms of interventionism, such as providing weapons and aid to revolutionary or national liberation movements. For this reason, consideration of non-Western or non-liberal-democratic states is beyond the scope of this article.

IV. A proposed spectrum

A. Overview – reading the chart

[Figure 6: Foreign policy spectrum – click to enlarge]

In constructing this chart, foreign policy positions have been grouped into five main categories (in green), from ‘left’ to ‘right’:

(i) Anti-imperialists

(ii) Anti-interventionists

(iii) Limited interventionists

(iv) Apologetic imperialists

(v) Unapologetic imperialists

The boundaries between these categories are somewhat fuzzy, as they fall along a continuum. This spectrum runs from the ‘left’, which opposes interventionism, and the ‘right’, which generally favours it. The y-axis is also used to show how these groups may differ or converge on domestic policy, though this is a secondary consideration.

Political groups (in purple) that are directly linked to the same category are first-order links. These groups will often agree substantially on foreign policy. Groups that are not linked to the same category, but which are linked to neighbouring categories on the spectrum, may form second-order links. These groups will often share some capacity to cooperate on foreign policy matters, even if the assumptions (or first principles) which underly their perspectives are substantially different. If the link between two political groups is more remote than a second-order link, then political cooperation between them on foreign policy matters will generally be unviable.

B. Categories

(i) Anti-imperialists

Sub-categories:

Marxists, most socialists, some left-libertarians, and some pacifists.

Assumptions:

‘Anti-imperialists’ (with the possible exception of pacifists) are generally less focused on the morality of foreign policy decisions. So, while morality is important, it tends not to frame their analysis. What distinguishes them from ‘anti-interventionists’ is they tend to focus more on structural issues, such as the political economy of imperialism.

For them, Western interventionism is an outgrowth of its political-economic model. There are thus no ‘good’ interventions. Even interventions that are apparently justified on moral grounds will be manipulated to serve the ends of Western imperialism in time, if not from the very outset. The emphasis on structural and systemic factors means that anti-imperialists are less prone to being swayed by moralistic arguments in favour of intervention.

Policy prescriptions:

For anti-imperialists, the tendency towards intervention is an outgrowth of a system that is rotten to the core. Thus, the only way to overcome Western imperialism is to abolish or replace the political economy of Western society. Most, however, perceive this goal as a medium or long-term objective.

For this reason, anti-imperialists tend to align with anti-interventionists, even if they do not think that the anti-interventionists ultimately have the answers to the problem of Western interventionism. Alignment with anti-interventionists therefore centres around more immediate concerns, such as adhering to diplomacy, international law, and coalition and consensus-building.

(ii) Anti-interventionists

Sub-categories:

Most pacifists, some socialists, most left-libertarians, most right-libertarians, some social democrats, and some paleo-conservatives.

Assumptions:

‘Anti-interventionists’ tend to focus more on the immorality of interventionism. For them, the use or threat of military or economic hard power against weaker states is malum in se. So too is warmongering with the other great powers. Instead, Western powers should actively pursue diplomacy with a view to peace and mutual gain. In the rare instances where military actions are undertaken, they should be compliant with international law rather than vague interventionist notions like the ‘rules-based order’.

The anti-interventionist camp is a big tent composed of many different groups that are generally unrepresented in the foreign policy establishment. Unlike anti-imperialists, they believe that the Western political-economic system is salvageable, so long as it is inwardly-focused and non-interventionist.

Policy prescriptions:

As such, anti-interventionists range from being sceptical of Western ideals, to being agnostic, to being generally in favour of them, insofar as they are peaceful and abide by the principle of non-aggression. Yet, these internal disagreements are relatively insignificant, as anti-interventionists are fundamentally opposed to the use of hard power to implement their foreign policy objectives on other states. Instead, policy objectives should instead be pursued via diplomacy and non-coercive persuasion.

(iii) Limited interventionists

Sub-categories:

Some conservatives, some mainstream liberals and social democrats, most neo-realists, and most paleo-conservatives.

Assumptions:

‘Limited interventionists’ are generally, though not always, committed to ‘Western ideals’. Yet, they are sceptical of the West’s ability to impose these ideals via kinetic force or sanctions. They are therefore generally open to diplomacy with other great powers, even so-called ‘autocracies’.

Limited interventionists are distinguished from anti-interventionists in that they do not see intervention as wrong in itself. However, they believe that attempts to impose Western values and political norms on target states by using hard power is practically ineffective. They are also sceptical of the relevance and usefulness of international law. Yet, unlike apologetic imperialists, they are also sceptical of self-congratulatory Western concepts, such as the ‘rules-based order’.

Limited interventionists therefore oppose interventions on the basis that they are bad strategy. Interventions such as the Iraq War are therefore not denounced as immoral, but rather as ‘blunders’, ‘mistakes’, or ‘distractions’ attributable to foreign policy incompetence.

Policy prescriptions:

For these reasons, limited interventionists argue that Western states should prioritise confrontation with primary strategic competitors. In the present geopolitical context, this means that they tend to deemphasise the relevance of the Russia/Ukraine conflict, and argue that Western ‘interests’ would be better served via confrontation with China. They are thus tacitly imperialist in their outlook.

(iv) Apologetic imperialists

Sub-categories:

Some neo-realists, some social democrats, most mainstream liberals, and some conservatives.

Assumptions:

‘Apologetic imperialists’ are more ideologically committed to liberalism than unapologetic imperialists. The tend to believe in Western liberal ideals and universalist principles. Apologetic imperialism is the hegemonic mode of ‘foreign policy’ discourse in the West.

The actual practice of Western foreign policy is often at variance with these professed ideals, however. Apologetic imperialists are therefore more likely to be critical of some of the effects of Western imperialism, even as they seek to uphold Western primacy on a strategic level. The status quo is thus framed as imperfect, but nonetheless preferable to an alternative hegemony, or to multipolarity.

Apologetic imperialists place great weight on the role of electoral politics in influencing foreign policy decisions. Their approach towards foreign countries also turns greatly on whether that state is an ally, and whether it is perceived as a ‘democracy’ or an ‘autocracy’. Diplomacy is seen as being viable with ‘democracies’ (or, alternatively, states ‘moving towards democracy’), but not with ‘autocracies’, as this would amount to ‘appeasement’. As such, apologetic imperialists tend to be more hawkish towards Russia than limited interventionists.

Policy prescriptions:

The above are all relevant considerations in determining whether a state is acting in accordance with the ‘rules-based order’. If not, the state may be seen as a candidate for Western intervention in the form of military force or economic warfare. The more structural criticisms of these ventures made by anti-imperialists and anti-interventionists are generally dismissed as being ‘anti-American’ or ‘anti-Western’.

Apologetic imperialists are usually more critical of non-Western states than of Western states, whose nature is perceived as being fundamentally good. Thus, when a fresh intervention is proposed, apologetic imperialists tend to side with the unapologetic imperialists more often than they do with anti-interventionists. Apologetic imperialists also perform a soft power function by presenting Western interventions as a matter of principle, rather than geopolitical self-interest. They also tend to be more critical of past Western interventions than of present ones.

(v) Unapologetic imperialists

Sub-categories:

Most Western conservatives, Zionists, neoconservatives, and fascists.

Assumptions:

Unapologetic imperialists have a zero-sum conception of international relations, where one’s gain is another’s loss. In this respect, they are not unlike neorealists. However, unlike neorealists, they have a much higher estimation of the West’s ability to impose its will on the rest of the world.

Unapologetics are also far less circumspect than realists about the possible negative externalities or ‘blowback’ that may result from an intervention. A good encapsulation of this is the so-called ‘Ledeen Doctrine’, that ‘[e]very ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.’[8]

Unapologetic imperialists have a fundamentally Darwinist interpretation of international relations. Imposing one’s will on another is simply the law of the jungle in action. Use of force is thus not ‘wrong’, per se, but merely a successful manifestation of a universal will-to-power tendency that all states and peoples share, whether they admit it or not.

Interestingly, unapologetic imperialists usually have a tacit understanding that Western hegemony is based on the subjugation of the global south. But they do not see this as a negative. Rather, insofar as they acknowledge it, they tend to speak of it in terms of a civilising mission.[9] Competing civilisations, be they Chinese, Russian, Islamic, or otherwise, are seen as inferior and a threat to the Western ‘way of life’.

Policy prescriptions:

As such, except in cases of expediency, mutual-gain-based diplomacy is to be discarded in favour of the implementation of hard power to extract unilateral concessions. Unapologetic imperialism is the most interventionist of the strands of Western foreign policy thinking. And while it is not considered ’mainstream’ within Western civil society, it tends to be greatly over-represented in the upper strata of the Western policy-making apparatus.

V. Possible applications

Plainly, this spectrum adopts a generally ‘left-wing’ or ‘critical’ perspective. But it should nonetheless be useful to anyone seeking to identify the trends within Western ‘foreign policy’ thinking, and to categorise them accordingly.

One possible application of this spectrum is in assessing the prospects of coalition-building on foreign policy issues. Foreign policy blocs can generally be formed between groups that fall within the same category, notwithstanding disagreements they may have on domestic policy. It may also be possible to form broad coalitions between groups connected to neighbouring categories. In the case of more remote connections, the prospects for coalition-building are minimal.

Perhaps the largest gap between individual categories is that between categories (i) and (ii), as the former rejects liberal democracy completely and has virtually zero representation within the Western political establishment. Moreover, while much of the general public’s views would probably sit between (ii) and (iv), both (iv) and (v) are massively over-represented in elite society and the organs of Western policy formation.

VI. Conclusion

Constructing political spectrums is a highly subjective and speculative exercise. Models are often proposed with little forethought or explanation of how they are constructed. Often, these omissions are a deliberate attempt to conceal motivated reasoning. And these shortcomings are especially egregious in the case of foreign policy discourse.

However, given that the idea of a ‘political spectrum’ is by now firmly embedded in the Western cultural vocabulary, one cannot simply opt out of using terms like ‘right’ and ‘left’ to explain or summarise their views. My intention here has therefore not been to reinvent the wheel, but merely attempt to offer a slight, reasonably well thought-through improvement upon the models that people already use colloquially. Whether I have succeeded or not is probably best left in the safekeeping of readers.

[1] The plural form of ‘spectrum’ is given by the Oxford Dictionary as either ‘spectra’ or ‘spectrums’. I’ve used the latter for the sake of clarity, as the former is rarely used.

[2] Simon Choat, ‘”Horseshoe theory” is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in common’, Conversation (12 May 2017).

[3] See, for instance, Jan Dutkiewicz and Dominik Stecuła, ‘Why America’s far right and far left have aligned against helping Ukraine’, Foreign Policy (4 July 2022); Deborah Lipstadt, ‘From right to left and in between: Jew-hatred across the political divide’, United States Department of State (remarks, 21 February 2024).

[4] Chris Joyner, ‘Ukraine seen as training ground for some on far right’, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (4 March 2022).

[5] Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Israel, 2018) s 1.B.

[6] A notable example of this is John Hagee, pastor and the founder of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), himself a Holocaust revisionist, who believes that Hitler was a ‘half-breed Jew’ sent by God as a ‘hunter’ of European Jewry.
     See Bruce Wilson, ‘”Half-breed Jew” committed Holocaust, claims Netanyahu ally John Hagee’, HuffPost (12 March 2015).

[7] Paul Hasluck (Minister for External Affairs, Australia) ‘Australian foreign policy’ (speech, Monash University, Melbourne, 13 January 1967).

[8] Quoted in Justin Logan, ‘Nothing new under the sun’, Cato Institute (15 October 2008).

[9] An example of this line of thinking is given by Winston Churchill:
‘I do not admit… that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia… by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race… has come in and taken its place.’ Quoted in Guardian, ‘The Churchill you didn’t know’ (28 November 2002).